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Abstract
In the present paper we aim to provide a thoughtful and exegetical
account of the fundamental ideas at the basis of Boole’s theory, with the
goal of developing our investigation strictly within the conceptual struc-
ture originally introduced by Boole himself. In particular, we will focus
on the meaning and the usefulness of the methods of the developments.
We will also consider a slight variation of it that will allow us to to present
in a new light some important and ingenuous aspects of Boole’s calculus
examined by the author in his work. Finally, a large attention is devoted
to the analysis of the “neglected” logical connective of division.
1 Introduction and outline
Anyone approaching the study of George Boole’s The Laws of Thought, [4],
a classic from the origins of modern logic, would expect to find in the critical
literature a clear explanation of the fundamental ideas on which Boole based his
theory of logic. In our opinion no such explanation has yet been given, though
there are attempts to account for Boole’s theory by means of complex algebraic
systems, see [15] and [7].
In the present paper we aim to provide a clear and exhaustive account of
the fundamental ideas at the basis of Boole’s whole theory of logic without
appealing to anything other than concepts introduced by Boole himself in the
chapters I-VI of The Laws of Thought.
According to JamesW. van Evra [20], “While there is general agreement that
his work occupies an important place in the history of logic, the exact nature of
that importance remains elusive.” We believe that we can show that the nature
of that importance consists in ingenious and refined ideas on which his logical
theory is based. The calculus that Boole takes as model for his logical theory is
quantitative algebra. Both calculi are built on the same language based on the
operations ×,+,−, /; Boole goes to great lengths to show that those operations
share the same formal properties since the variables of logical theory are inter-
preted on sets. Nevertheless, according to Boole, the formal correspondences
between the two calculi are so strong and deep that we can address a logical
problem by using transformations typical of algebra and interpret the result
in logical terms. Section 2 of the present paper is devoted to showing aspects
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of this correspondence1. Section 3 starts out from Boole’s turning point: the
recognition of a crucial difference between the two calculi, a difference that can
be formalized in the law of duality:
xx = x.
The product among classes is idempotent, which is not, as we know, among
numbers. Boole assumes this law as the defining property of classes: if anything
is a class, then the law of duality holds for it; on the algebraic side, 0 and
1, seen as numbers, fulfill the law of duality. The correspondence can be re-
established: the functions of this new (quantitative) algebra will be functions
f : {0, 1}n → Q. We call the resulting calculus, the pseudo-binary calculus.
This is in fact what Boole calculus really is: a pseudo-binary system, and not
a purely binary one, as many may expect after the re-foundation of Boole’s
algebra pursued by Boole’s successors!
Now to a central question of Boole’s project: given a function in the {×,+,−, /, 0, 1}-
language, what class does it represent ? The answer to this question is of fun-
damental importance and Boole answers it with the method of developments.
Let us start by considering the pseudo-binary calculus limited to the functions
f : {0, 1}n → Z in the language {×,+,−, 0, 1}. We show that in this case
the method of developments is equivalent to a variant of it that we call the
method of intersections. This variant we propose is very helpful to give a logical
interpretation to the pseudo-binary calculus.
Just to get an intuitive idea, let us start by observing that given n classes
x1, . . . , xn, the universe can be partitioned into 2
n regions:
1 = x1 + (1 − x1)
1 = x1x2 + x1(1− x2) + (1 − x1)x2 + (1− x1)(1− x2)
1 = x1x2x3 + x1x2(1 − x3) + x1(1 − x2)x3 + (1 − x1)x2x3 + x1(1 − x2)(1 −
x3) + (1− x1)x2(1− x3) + (1− x1)(1− x2)x3 + (1− x1)(1 − x2)(1 − x3)
. . .
See Figure 1.
xy
xyy(1− x) x(1− y)
(1− x)(1− y)
Figure 1: Development of 1 in two variables
Then any arbitrary class a = f(x, y) expressed by a function of the variables,
say x and y, can be represented as a disjoint union as follows
axy + ax(1− y) + a(1− x)y + a(1− x)(1 − y)
1We are well aware that we here address a much debated and well known topic, still we
think it is important to note certain similarities and/or dissimilarities
2
This representation, given by the method of intersections, is equivalent to
what is obtained by the method of developments but at the same time it rep-
resents a class as the disjoint union of its ”shadows” over the different regions
into which the universe is partitioned. See Figure 2.
xyy(1− x) x(1− y)
(1− x)(1− y)
A
Figure 2: The shadow of A
We immediately see that the set-theoretical union relevant here is the ex-
clusive one. Boole has been severely blamed by Frege for having privileged the
exclusive union instead of inclusive one, but Boole had very good reasons for
his choice.
In Section 3.2 we show that if we limit ourselves to consider functions fn :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we end up with nothing but the truth functions. Now, if we
interpret the variables on propositions, the product as ∧, + as ∨ and 1 − x as
¬x, then the development of fn(x1, . . . , xn) gives the proposition in disjunctive
normal form whose truth table is fn(x1, . . . , xn). In this case too, the use of
exclusive disjunction is the natural one even if the inclusive one works as well.
There is more to the exclusive union and inclusive subtraction than a mere
success in applying the method of intersections, these two operations are partial
operations, they are not defined when x and y are not disjoint or when y is not
a subset of x and this, as we will see, corresponds perfectly to the cases in which
the algebraic value of x+y or x−y is outside {0, 1}. The correspondence between
the two calculi is amazing! In Section 3.3 we compare Boole’s explanation of
his strategy for treating non binary coefficients with our motivations based on
the use of the methods of intersections.
So far so good, but one could object that the logical calculus was intended
to be a calculus of arbitrary classes, not just a calculus of the universal and the
empty class only. It is well known from the standard propositional calculus and
universal algebra that whatever can be said about arbitrary classes is reducible
to what can be said about the universal and empty classes, see Section 3.2.
Therefore as far as the logical principles are concerned, nothing is lost.
In Section 3.4 we comment on the very controversial solutions proposed
by Boole when dealing with functions f : {0, 1}n → Q in the language also
containing the operation of division. The main problem is how to interpret
such terms as 0/0 and 1/0 possibly occurring in the developments of these
functions. We show that these cases too admit of a logical interpretation by
extending the equivalence between the method of developments and the method
of intersections from an algebraic point of view.
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2 Logic and Algebra: a Formal Correspondence
In his celebrated work An Investigation of the Laws of Thought [1854] George
Boole analyzes the structural similarities between quantitative algebra and logi-
cal reasoning in more details than he had done in his previous work The *Mathe-
matical Analysis of Logic. His claim is the existence of evident formal analogies
shared by the universal laws of algebra and those of logic. Such formal analo-
gies would be indeed so evident to be expressible in a common mathematical
language in terms of equations having the same syntactical form. The semantic
interpretation of any equation of this type will of course differ within the two
different domains (quantitative algebra and logic); the revealed formal analogy
does not have in fact to correspond to some conceptual identity. The syntactical
match is rather obtained in virtue of the use of the ordinary algebraic formal-
ism as a unifying language between the two fields, and nothing can be said at
the ontological level. Boole himself openly expresses his empirical attitude of
hypotheses non fingo concerning the nature of this correspondence by pointing
out that
...it is not affirmed that the process of multiplication in Algebra (...)
possesses in itself any analogy with that process of logical combina-
tion wich xy has been made to represent above; but only that if the
arithmetical and logical process are expressed in the same manner,
their symbolical expressions will be subject to the same formal law.
(p.31)
Same formal laws, different semantic interpretations: this is really the essence
of the modern conception of formalism! The variables of the language will be
interpreted either as numerical quantities, when our investigation concerns nu-
merical algebra, or as classes of objects, when our investigation is oriented to
logic, but the form of the respective laws will coincide.
2.1 Logical operations and their interpretative problems
The first example of correspondence between ordinary quantitative algebra and
abstract logic that Boole shows concerns the multiplication symbol ×, whose
logical interpretation turns out to correspond to the set theoretical operation of
class intersection ∩2:
2The legitimacy of an extensional approach to the treatment of concepts can be vindicated
already from the beginning of Boole’s [4]:
(...) let x represent “all men”, or the class “men”. By a class is usually meant a
collection of individuals, to each of which a particular name or description may
be applied (p.28)
His theory always admits in fact a set-theoretical interpretation and therefore can legiti-
mately be viewed as a theory of classes. This does not mean that Boole really speaks the
language of a contemporary set theorist. In this respect, the specific case of the “class inter-
section” operator even constitutes a particularly delicate case (see the following footnotes 5
and 6). It is nevertheless clear that we can immediately translate all the conceptual operations
that he describes in the vocabulary of modern set theory, as we do in this case. We will adopt
this approach throughout the paper, since we are mainly interested in investigating the value
of Boole’s system from a modern perspective.
4
Let it (...) be agreed, that by the combination xy shall be rep-
resented that class of things to which the names or descriptions
represented by x and y are simultaneously applicable.3(p.28)
Boole claims that logical multiplication satisfies, formally, the same law of
commutativity that holds of algebraic multiplication, or, more exactly, he af-
firmes that the two laws of commutativity holding in the two different domains
can be expressed syntactically in the same way, as xy = yx:
In the case of x representing white things, and y sheep, either of the
members of this equation will represent the class of “white sheep”.
There may be a difference as to the order in which the conception
is formed, but there is none as to the individual things which are
comprehended under it. In like manner, if x represent “estuaries”,
and y “rivers”, the expressions xy and yx will indifferently repre-
sent “rivers that are estuaries”, or “estuaries that are rivers”, the
combination in this case being in ordinary language that of two sub-
stantives, instead of that of a substantive and an adjective as in the
previous instance. Let there be a third symbol, as z, representing
the class of things to which the term “navigable” is applicable, and
any one of the following expressions,
zxy, zyx, xyz, ecc.
will represent the class of “navigable rivers that are estuaries”. (p.29)
Consistently with this, Boole observes that this law “may be characterized
by saying that the literal symbols x, y, z are commutative, like the symbols of
Algebra” (p.31)4
2.1.1 Sum and subtraction as partial operations
The quoted paragraph above is paradigmatic of Boole’s peculiar presentation
of his logical system: he does not introduce a “static” axiomatic calculus built
on basic statements conceived as eternal a priori truths. He rather investigates
the rules of natural language and of the psychological construction of concepts
almost as an experimental scientist. The formal basic equations of logic are
presented in the context of a colloquial and informal discussion which is mostly
aimed at persuading the reader about the plausibility of the results, and perhaps
also at revealing the experience that led Boole to their discovery. For this reason,
the main evidence for the fundamental logical laws that he formulates consists
in concrete linguistic examples so obvious that nobody could raise any objection
to their universal validity.
3As is customary in algebra, Boole always omits to write explicitly the occurrence of the
symbol ×.
4Boole is so used to the customary omission of the product symbol in the current algebraic
notation that he apparently recognizes here no operation at all! He ascribes indeed the com-
mutativity property not to the logical operator in itself, but to the variables alone! Actually,
although there might be really some ambiguity in this context, he refers explicitly to the logical
process of combination as compared to the arithmetical process of multiplication (p.31), as we
have seen. Therefore, at least the existence of two analogue “processes” in the two respective
fields is assumed; and if the arithmetical product is an operator, the same applies then to the
logical combination.
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Hence, not surprisingly, the method applied to prove the commutativity of
the product is directly extended to the sum:
We are not only capable of entertaining the conceptions of objects,
[...] but also of forming the aggregate conceptions of a group of ob-
jects consisting of partial groups, each of which is separately named
or described. For this purpose we use the conjunctions “and”, “or”,
etc. “Trees and minerals,” “barren mountains, and fertile vales,” are
examples of this kind. In strictness, the words “and”, “or”, inter-
posed between the terms descriptive of two or more classes of objects,
imply that those classes are quite distinct, so that no member of one
is found in another. In this and in all other respects the words “and”
“or” are analogous with the sign + in algebra, and their laws are
identical. Thus the expression “men and women” is [...] equivalent
with the expression “women and men”. Let x represent “men”, y,
“women”; and let + stand for “and’ ’ or “or”, then we have
x+ y = y + x,
an equation which would equally hold true if x and y represented
numbers, and + were the sign of arithmetical sum. (pp.32-33)
One should not be confused by the use of “and” in this context: as is clear
from the explanation, the operation in question is not class intersection, but
rather the union of (disjoint) classes. This is in fact consistent with an idiomatic
use of the preposition “and” in our ordinary language, aimed at joining, although
incorrectly, disjoint notions.
We will call this particular set theoretical form of union “disjoint union”. As
is well known, the preference accorded by Boole to the disjunctive interpretation
of the union instead of its inclusive version (joining sets that may overlap) has
met in the literature a lively criticism since Jevons’ work (see [13], p.70–71).
Even the founder of contemporary mathematical logic, G. Frege, defined Boole’s
choice a “retrograde step away from Leibniz”.5
In this paper we rather support the opposite view: arguments defending this
and others of Boole’s original proposals will be provided and discussed. It is
true that in many circumstances his treatment of logic does not exactly coincide
with the expectations of present day logicians, but this does not always entail a
defect in its pristine design. We believe indeed that Boole should be regarded
as “something more” than a clumsy pioneer of the system now called “Boolean
algebra”. He introduced a prolific discipline whose goals are often different
from those of our modern conception of logic, but with an independent value in
themselves.
This holds for instance, in our opinion, of the disjoint union. We will not
deny that this operation apparently carries a very unwelcome disadvantage: the
occurrence of terms lacking of interpretations for some variable interpretations.
An immediate example is “x+ y”, which is semantically undefined unless x and
5Frege’s Posthumous Writings: “On one point indeed Boole has taken a retrogade step
away from Leibniz, in adding to the leibnizian meaning of A+B the condition that the classes
A and B should have no common element. W.Stanley Jevons, E. Schro¨der and others have
quite rightly not followed him in this.”( pag 10)
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y denote disjoint classes. Nevertheless, there are several arguments in favour of
Boole’s choice.
Firstly, one could observe that symbolic logic is nowadays a subject that has
gained a mature status of independence from traditional mathematics, whereas
Boole’s aim was that of showing that the connections linking logic and algebra
were as close as they could be. In this particular respect, it is to be noted in
the first place that the cardinality of a finite set A ∪ B is equal to the sum of
the cardinalities of A and B only if A and B are disjoint sets.
Another fundamental similarity with ordinary algebra justifying the use of
disjoint union can be found in its connection with its dual operator, introduced
by Boole himself: the logical subtraction.
The latter constitutes in fact a sort of “inclusive subtraction”, where the
removed set must be completely included in the set from which it is substracted:
the term x − y will denote in fact the result of removing the class y from the
class x, under the assumption that y is a subset of x. Again, the term “x− y”
will be undefined unless this condition is fulfilled:
(...) we cannot conceive it possible to collect parts into a whole, and
not conceive it also possible to separate a part from a whole. This
operation we express in common language by the sign except, as, “All
men except Asiatics,” “All states except those which are monarchi-
cal.” Here it is implied that the things excepted form a part of the
things from which they are excepted. As we have expressed the op-
eration of aggregation by the sign +, so we may express the negative
operation above described by − minus. Thus if x be taken to repre-
sent men, and y, Asiatics, i. e. Asiatic men, then the conception of
“All men except Asiatics” will be expressed by x− y. (pp.33-34)
Still, these semantic restrictions make the logical subtraction be the formal
inverse of the logical sum, like in integer algebra. Firstly, Boole observes that
the transformation of x = y + z into x− z = y is valid:
Let us take the Proposition, “The stars are the suns and the planets”,
and let us represent stars by x, suns by y, and planets by z; we have
then
x = y + z.
Now if it be true that the stars are the suns and the planets, it will
follow that the stars, except the planets, are suns6. This would give
the equation
x− z = y,
(...) Thus a term z has been removed from one side of an equation
to the other by changing its sign. This is in accordance with the
algebraic rule of transposition. (pp.35–36)
The inference from x = y+z to x−z = y is valid in virtue of the disjointness
of y and z, as the example just mentioned shows (and Euler diagrams prove
universally).
6Actually, as is clear from the context, Boole means not only that the remainder consists
in some suns, but, rather, in exactly all suns.
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In contrast, if y and z were allowed to overlap, the validity of this inference
would no longer be deducible: by removing from x all the elements which also
are in z it might be the case that only some, but not all, members of y are
preserved.
Hence, the restriction imposed to the logical sum justifies the given inference.
Secondly, let us consider the opposite direction, from x− z = y to x = y+ z.
Assume x− z = y, if the class z is entirely included in x, as Boole requires, by
re-adding z to the result of the previous subtraction, y, we indeed come back to
x (Euler-Venn diagrams can be used for a clarification).
But what would happen in modern set theory?
The definition of set subtraction used in this theory, as well as that of set
union, avoids the occurrence of potentially vacuous terms: the set A \ B is in
fact defined as A∩B, where overlineB is the complementary set of B, hence it
has always a denotation for every interpretation of A and B. In particular, B
does not need to be contained in A.
Well, for this notion of subtraction, the inverse of Boole’s inference would be
no more justified: for z possibly overflowing extensionally outside x, the result
of adding z to any given set, in particular to y (i.e. x− z), may possibly exceed
x.
The restriction imposed on the subtraction is then necessary to guarantee
the inverse of Boole’s inference.
In any case, the operator \ coincides with Boole’s subtraction under the
same semantical restiriction, that is, when B ⊆ A.
A further argument supporting Boole’s conception of subtraction can be in-
spired by elementary arithmetic: within the realm of natural numbers, x − y
has in fact a denotation only when y is a quantity entirely “contained” in the
quantity x.
2.1.2 Commutativity and associativity laws: a rift in the correspon-
dence
As it is indifferent for all the essential purposes of reasoning whether
we express excepted cases first or last in the order of speech, it is also
indifferent in what order we write any series of terms, some of which
are effected by the sign −. Thus we have, as in common algebra,
x− y = −y + x. (p.34)
In ordinary algebra the term x−y can be transformed into −y+x by applying
the commutative law, but the validity of the equation x − y = −y + x requires
the introduction of negative numbers. We read in fact −y+ x as the sum of −y
with +x. We apply then the commutativity law for the sum (and conventional
syntactical abbreviations, such as that reducing, say, (+a) + (−b) to (a− b) to
get x − y = (+x) + (−y) = (−y) + (+x) = −y + x. Without the introduction
of negative numbers and terms, the term −y+ x would simply be syntactically
wrong, hence meaningless.
This fact is completely overlooked by Boole, who does not explain what a
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“negative concept” might be7, although, as we have seen, he sometimes explicitly
refers to the signs of the terms: “a term z has been removed from one side of
an equation to the other by changing its sign” (p.36), or “any series of terms,
some of which are effected by the sign −” (p.34).
To try and solve the dilemma, one may introduce, in virtue of a mere con-
vention, the term −y+x as a syntactically well constructed expression denoting
the same class as x− y. But this simple solution would hardly be applicable to
the general case of “any series of terms, some of which are effected by the sign
−” (p.34). For example: what could be said about the term x+ y − z? Would
it have the same denotation as x − z + y? Actually, the term x + y − z looks
syntactically quite ambiguous: is the class z removed from the class x + y or
from the class y only? This ambiguity disappears in ordinary algebra, where
the two terms x+ (y − z) and (x+ y)− z have the same denotation. But what
about Boole’s logical calculus?
A little detour concerning the associative laws is in order, laws that Boole,
to the best of our knowledge, never takes into consideration. Actually, the
applications of the associative laws in absence of occurrences of the subtraction
symbol look definitely non problematic in the logical calculus, too. In fact
(x + y) + z = x + (y + z) is valid (for all suitable variable interpretations) as
well as (xy)z = x(yz) (always). The discrepancy between the two calculi really
arises when negative terms appear, as with the case x+ y − z we started with.
The equation (x+y)−z = x+(y−z) is not universally valid in Boole’s calculus,
it fails in fact for those interpretations for which z is a subset of x+ y but not
of y alone. Consequently, the search for a solution of our question whether
x+ y − z = x− z + y (1)
should impose at least the use of explicit brackets.
(a) Let us start with the reading of the first term as x+(y−z). In this case z is
supposed to be a subset of y. Is there a reading of x− z + y to justify (7)? The
reading of x− z+ y as (x− z)+ y would in general be not allowed, since z is not
necessarily a subset of x. On the other hand, the reading as x+ (−z + y) even
if potentially correct on the basis of the convention that −z + y = y − z adds
a new occurrence of + which is not contained in the original term x − z + y,
and moreover reads automatically −z and y as paired. This is admissible in
algebra, but in the context of Boolean calculus it probably requires some ad hoc
syntactical convention.
(b) Consider now the reading of the first term as (x + y) − z. Is there a
reading of x− z+ y to justify (7)? A variable interpretation according to which
z is a subset of x + y but not of either x or y would be compatible with the
given reading of the first term, but with none of the second, as both (x− z)+ y
or x+ (−z + y) would not be acceptable.
One could then try and fix precise laws for an obligatory explicit use of
brackets, but this solution would make Boole’s calculus quite clumsy to handle.
Boole ignores this and similar problematic aspects in the presentation of his
7The most intuitive solution, that is., interpreting negative concepts as “complementary”
classes, is not acceptable: Boole will define the complement of a class in a different manner,
as we shall see later. For the moment, we only point out once again that the complementation
operator is subject to no constraint, whereas a very strong constraint regulates the use of the
subtraction sign, hence they must differ substantially.
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system and instead concentrates, strategically, on those where a perfect cor-
respondence between the two calculi can be exhibited, as in the case of the
distributivity laws:
Let x represent “men”, y, “women” (...)
Let the symbol z stand for the adjective “European”, then since it
is, in effect, the same thing to say “European men and women”, as
to say “European men and European women”, we have
z(x+ y) = zx+ zy.
And this equation also would be equally true were x, y and z symbols
of number (...) (p.33)
Still representing by x the class “men”, and by y “Asiatics”, let z
represent the adjective “white”. Now to apply the adjective “white”
to the collection of men expressed by the phrase “Men except Asi-
atics” is the same as to say, “White men, except white Asiatics”.
Hence we have
z(x− y) = zx− zy.
This is also in accordance with the laws of ordinary algebra (p.34)
3 The duality law and Boole’s pseudo-binary
calculus
Boole’s pivotal move is the recognition of a crucial difference between the two
calculi, a difference that can be formalized in the law of duality:
xx = x.
An explanation of this law is immediate: intersecting a set x with itself
results in the set x itself. Hence, the product among classes is idempotent,
which is not, as we know, among numbers.
As a most striking discrepancy between the two domains,8 this property will
characterize very efficiently the notion of class in Boole’s system: if anything is
a class, then the law of duality will hold for it.9
But what follows now is a revolutionary idea with an enormous long lasting
influence in the future development of logic and informaticsf˙ootnoteAlthough
Boole was in this respect anticipated by Leibniz.
It is well true that the law of duality does not hold, in general, over the
whole domain of quantities, but, as he himself immediately points out, it can at
least hold in some little fragment of it: more precisely on the sub-domain {0, 1}!
In this way, Boole is entitled to give a new life to his beloved correspondence:
8 See also the equation (18) as far as the division operator is concerned.
9Boole apparently finds another break of the simmetry, when he observes the impossibility
of infering, in his system, the truth of x = y from that of zx = zy. Such an inference cannot
indeed hold universally for all interpretations of x, y and z as classes. But after a little
hesitation he is able to re-establish the desired analogy through the following remark: this
inference is not even in algebra universally valid, although at a first superficial sight it might
look to be so, in fact not acceptable for a vanishing y (pp.36–37).
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the match between the logical system and the ordinary algebraic calculus can
be re-established provided that the interpretation of the numerical variables is
limited to {0, 1}:
We have seen (...) that the symbols of Logic are subject to the
special law,
x2 = x.
Now of the symbols of Number there are but two, viz. 0 and 1, which
are subject to the same formal law. We know that 02 = 0, and that
12 = 1; and the equation x2 = x, considered as algebraic, has no
other roots than 0 and 1. Hence, instead of determining the measure
of formal agreement of the symbols of Logic with those of Number
generally, it is more immediately suggested to us to compare them
with the symbols of quantity admitting only of the value 0 and 1.
Let us conceive, then, of an Algebra in which the symbols x, y, z, etc.
admit indifferently of the values 0 and 1, and of these values alone.
The laws, the axioms, and the processes, of such an Algebra will be
identical in their whole extent with the laws, the axioms, and the
processes of an Algebra of Logic. Difference of interpretation will
alone divide them. Upon this principle the method of the following
work is established. (pp.37-38)
This passage is very important for two main reasons.
(a) Boole introduces a new calculus, a sort of binary calculus that we will
call “pseudo-binary”. It is true that variables can assume only the values 0 and
1, but this does not automatically extends to all terms. For instance, the term
x+y will assume the value 2 when both variables x and y are assigned the value
1. In this respect, Boole’s logic (with operators ×,+,−)10 deals with functions
f : {0, 1}n → Z, rather then with functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
(b) The last statement sets the method that Boole will use throughout his
book: the validity of any given logical law or logically correct inference must be
provable by a sequence of calculations in the new algebraic calculus, obtained
from the usual one by adding instances of the duality law for all the variables.
The origin of our modern conception of Boolean algebra as a logical binary
calculus is to be found exactly in this strategy pursued by Boole! Still, this
fact should not induce the reader to underestimate some irreducible differences
between Boole’s original view and our modern treatment of what is nowadays
called Boolean algebra: (i) Boole’s pseudo-binary calculus has a quantitative
interpretation, whereas modern Boolean algebra is essentially qualitative and
sees 0 and 1 not as numbers but rather as truth values (they can in fact be
replaced by “true” and “false”); logical operators are then free from formal
connections with quantitative algebraic operations;11 (ii) it is well known that
modern Boolean algebra has both a propositional and a set theoretical inter-
pretation, Boole himself foresees the connections between the two fields, but he
conceives this relation in a complete different way with respect to our current
view, see Section 3.2.
10In Section 13 we will discuss the extension of the language to the division operator.
11Although quantitative interpretations of Boolean operators are still possible, as σˆ(A ∧
B) := min{σ(A), σ(B)}, σˆ(A∨B) := max{σ(A), σ(B)} , σˆ(¬A) := 1−σ(A), for σ(A), σ(B) ∈
{0, 1} ⊆ N.
11
We will be soon compelled to admit that the quantitative Boole’s pseudo-
binary calculus works really well, after all. A first motivation for this consists in
the possibility of reducing it to a systems of equations of the ordinary algebraic
calculus. More precisely, the assumption that all variables contained in a given
equation t = s, say x1, ..., xn, can be assigned only the values 0 and 1 can be
expressed by the following system of equations of the ordinary algebra:
x21 = x1
...
x2n = xn
t = s.
Of course, the only possible solutions of this system assign to x1, ..., xn values
in {0, 1}. This is therefore a basic step to reduce Boole’s pseudo-binary calculus
to the ordinary algebraic one. Although Boole never mentions it explicitly, this
procedure is suggested by his own words “the equation x2 = x, considered as
algebraic, has no other roots than 0 and 1”. (p.37)
The double interpretation (quantitative and set-theoretical) proposed by
Boole for his calculus does not concern only the binary operations, but also
the constant symbols 0 and 1. He lets 0 denote the empty set, and 1 the uni-
versal class. Such interpretations are not only merely conventional, there are
cogent motivations for that. In particular, an immediate set-theoretical reading
of the quantitatively valid equation 1 · x = x is that the intersection of the
whole with any class x results in the class x itself. Beside the possible ontologi-
cal justifications of interpreting 0 as the empty class (“no quantity=nothing=no
thing”), the equations 0 · x = 0 or x + 0 = x will provide analogue meaningful
set-theoretical motivations.
Since 1 is the whole, 1 − x will denote the complementary class of x. The
law of duality can now be re-written, via distributivity laws, as
x(1− x) = 0.
This equivalent notion expresses another fundamental property characterizing
the notion of class: the intersection of a set with its complement results in the
empty set.
The law of duality must hold for every term denoting a class: it holds for
variables in virtue of an assumption, it holds for 0 and 1 numerically. It holds
as well for the complement of every class, as the next easy argument shows:
let t denote a class, then t2 = t by induction hypothesis, hence (1 − t)2 =
(1− t)(1− t) = 1− 2t+ t2 = 1− 2t+ t = 1− t. Moreover, all terms denoting set
intersections of classes, say t1 · ... · tn, satisfy the duality law: (t1 · t2 · ... · tn)2 =
t1 · t2 · ... · tn · t1 · t2 · ... · tn = t21 · t
2
2 · ... · t
2
n = t1 · t2 · ... · tn. Consequenlty, the
terms that Boole calls “constituents” satisfy the same law: given n variables
v1, ..., vn, a constituent is nothing but a product whose i-th factor is either vi
or (1 − vi). For instance, all constituents expressible through x and y are xy,
x(1 − y), (1− x)y, (1 − x)(1 − y).
More generally, every term t representing a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
does denote a class, since f(x1, ..., xn)
2 = f(x1, ..., xn) holds necessarily. In
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other words, every expression that can assume only the values 0 and 1 for every
possible interpretation σ of the variables over {0, 1} will denote a class.12
On the other hand, there exist terms whose values lie in {0, 1} only for some
binary interpretations σ of their variables. This is for example the case, as we
know, of x + y but this is not a problem since the pseudo-binary calculus is
supposed to go hand in hand with the set theoretical interpretation: according
to both, x+ y will indeed denote a class not always but only sometimes. Even
more remarkably, the correspondence between the two interpretations looks even
stronger after a more careful inspection. On the one hand, x+y does not satisfy
the law of duality exactly for σ(x) = σ(y) = 1, with 0 and 1 seen as numbers.
Let us now have a deeper look at the set theoretical interpretation. The term
x+y denotes a set only when x and y are disjoint classes. The universal class is
not disjoint with itself, whereas the empty set is disjoint with everything (even
with itself!). Therefore, the sum of 1 with itself is even set theoretically not
acceptable, while any sum involving the empty set as one of its addenda will be
automatically admissible.13
This is a very appreciable property of Boole calculus: whatever can be said
for arbitrary classes is reducible to what can be said for the empty and the uni-
versal sets alone! Some explanation for this apparently bizzarre “set theoretical
collapse” is needed.14 We know that in modern propositional calculus every for-
mula admits of a double interpretation. According to the first option, variables
are seen as arbitrary propositions, and operation symbols ∧, ∨, ¬ as propo-
sitional connectives. In the second option, the variables are seen as arbitrary
sets and the operation symbols are interpreted as the set operators “union” (∪),
“intersection” (∩) and “complementation” (·). Nevertheless, one could mantain
that the first interpretation is somehow vacuously redundant. In fact, via the
usual binary truth value semantics, a propositional formula is reduced in reality
to a binary function over truth values. Hence, one could get rid of all that huge
world of arbitrary propositions and keep only a single tautology ⊤ and a single
contradiction ⊥. That is, the restriction of all possible variable interpretations
to the domain {⊤,⊥} suffices to establish whether a given formula is a tautol-
12This does not mean that for any given term t denoting a class each of its subterms will
do the same. For instance (1 + 1) − (1 + 1) satisfies the duality law (and can be viewed as
a name for the empty set), nevertheless its subterm 1+1 does not. Of course, one may ask
for an inductive definition of the notion of class term, in which case (1 + 1) − (1 + 1) would
no longer be admissible. But this requirement, which is not present in Boole’s work, would
restrict drastically the extension of the concept. A further example: (x + x) − x. This is
essentially only a redundant re-writing of the basic term x, which represents a class for both
binary interpretations of the involved variable x. Nevertheless, the subterm x + x satisfies
the duality law only for the interpretation σ(x) = 0. Our definition of class term as any term
satisfying the duality law is more tolerant than the inductive one, and can be very naturally
characterized in the following way. We call a term t′ primitive if it can algebraically be no
longer simplified. When a term t satisfies the duality law (possibly with respect to a variable
interpretation) and is reducible to the primitive term t′, then t has the same denotation as t′
in virtue of the equation t = t′ (this convention is of course well defined in virtue of the laws
of ordinary algebra, which imply the uniqueness of the primitive form t′ of t). Notice that
all subterms in t′ will satisfy the duality law (possibly with respect to the considered variable
interpretation). This approach looks very natural, but it will require some care for the case
of the division operator.
13In the example just discussed, we find another justification for Boole’s use of disjoint
union: overlapping sets are not acceptable, just like 1 + 1 = 2 /∈ {0, 1}!
14In contemporary algebra of logic this fact is a very well known consequence of the Stone’s
Representation Theorem. Still we want to give an intuitive motivation in terms of ordinary
propositional calculus.
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ogy, a contradiction, whether a formula is a logical consequence of others, and so
on. For what concerns this paper, the following remark is of crucial importance:
ordinary propositional logic and set theory define the same class of valid and
invalid equations (where “equation” in the first case must of course be intended
as “semantic equivalence”15). Therefore, to prove the validity of the equation
A∩ (B ∪C) = (A∩B)∪ (A∩C), one can convert this formula into the proposi-
tional formula A∧ (B ∨C) = (A∧B)∨ (A∧C), and then check its validity only
for those variable interpretations that assign to A,B,C the statements ⊤,⊥.
Correspondingly, the interpretation of A,B,C as the universal set or the empty
set must suffice to test the validity of A ∩ (B ∪ C) = (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩C).
We can interpret Boole’s operations as connectives whose meaning is fixed
by the truth tables given below. For the connective × nothing new. Its binary
interpretation coincides with the ordinary multiplication over {0, 1}, and hence
with the truth table of the propositional conjunction ∧:
A B A×B
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
This goes on a par with the fact that this operator corresponds to the ordi-
nary set theoretical intersection ∩.
As to the operator +, its binary truth-table can only be partial and this goes
on a par with the fact that this operator corresponds to the disjoint union
A B A+B
1 1 not allowed
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0
First, observe that the arithmetically non allowed case reflects, set theoreti-
cally, the unique case in which the corresponding sets are not disjoint, and hence
their union cannot be done. Second, the table expresses a partial truth function
which coincides, over its partial domain, with the truth table of aut, as well as
of vel. And here is a curious fact. Although it has often been stated that the
propositional interpretation of Boole’s sum is the exclusive disjunction,16 over
its domain of definibility, it can be read indifferently in both manners, as one
prefers!17
As to the operator −, its binary truth-table can again only be partial, as
well as its set theoretical interpretation as inclusive set subtraction:
15Every formula can obviously be reduced to a semantic equivalence via logical constants:
for example, A ∨ ¬A can be read as A ∨ ¬A ≡ ⊤, which corresponds set theoretically to
A ∪ overlineA = U , for U the universal set.
16 See for instance [19] p.23, [17] p.12, [6], p.175.
17 The acceptability of the inclusive interpretation has been pointed out already by J.
Corcoran ([9] p.71) and C. Badesa ([1] p.3), who is even inclined to recognize it as the one
really underlying Boole’s operator. Actually, both versions are correct.
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A B A−B
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 not allowed
0 0 0
Observe that the arithmetically non allowed case corresponds, set theoreti-
cally, to the unique case in which the set to be removed is not contained in the
other.
The truth table technique shows perfectly well that the empty and the uni-
versal set suffice for all semantic purposes, as they can simulate the behaviour of
true and false with respect to the propositional interpretations of ×,+,− and
they are even able to distinguish between allowed and non allowed cases.
This is enough for Boole’s “set theoretical collapse”.
3.1 The method of the developments
Given an arbitrary functional term18 defined in the {+,×,−, 1, 0}-language,
what class does it represent? The method of the developments transforms each
functional term in n variables into a term in canonical form i.e. a term expressed
by the sum of 2n products each of which is composed of a numerical value (a
coefficient) and a constituent.
Here is the development of f(x1, . . . , xn):
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
1≤i≤2n
f(σi(x1), . . . , σ
i(xn)) · si1 · ... · sin (2)
for all 2n possible binary functions σi : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} and sik , 1 ≤
k ≤ n, where:
sik =
{
xk if σ
i(xk) = 1
1− xk if σi(xk) = 0
.
An example: consider f(x1, x2); then
f(x1, x2) =
∑
1≤i≤4
f(σi(x1), σ
i(x2)) · si1 · si2 =
f(1, 1)·x1 ·x2 + f(1, 0)·x1·(1−x2) + f(0, 1)·(1−x1)·x2 + f(0, 0)·(1−x1)·(1−x2).
We have to show that the equality (2) is valid, i.e., however we interpret the
variables x1, . . . , xn that equality is true. This amounts to say that for every
interpretation τ of the variables x1, . . . , xn into {0, 1},
f(τ(x1), . . . , τ(xn)) =
∑
1≤i≤2n
f(σi(x1), . . . , σ
i(xn)) · τˆ (si1) · ... · τˆ (sin) (3)
18Coherently with Boole’s notation, we will not introduce a notational distinction between
functions and functional symbols. The difference will be clear from the context.
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where τˆ (xk) = τ(xk), and τˆ(1 − xk) = 1 − τ(xk). Notice that the n-tuple
(σi(x1), . . . , σ
i(xn)) is an n-tuple of 0 and 1, so the function τ plays no role on
f(σi(x1), . . . , σ
i(xn)).
The function τ is necessarily equal to a σj for exactly one j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, so
f(τ(x1), . . . , τ(xn)) = f(σ
j(x1), . . . , σ
j(xn)). Moreover we show that for that j:
τˆ (sj1) · ... · τˆ (sjn) is equal to 1. In fact for every k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, either sjk = xk
or sjk = 1− xk. In the first case σ
j(xk) = 1, therefore τˆ (sjk) = 1; in the second
case, σj(xk) = 0, therefore τˆ (sjk) = 1− τ(xk) = 1− σ
j(xk) = 1.
Now we show that for all h 6= j, 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n, (τˆ (sh1) · ... · τˆ (shn)) = 0. For,
let (σh(x1), . . . , σ
h(xn)) 6= (σj(x1), . . . , σj(xn)), say σh(xk) 6= σj(xk) for some
k, and consider the constituent sh1 · ... · shn . If σ
h(xk) = 1, then shk = xk and
σj(xk) = 0 (since σ
h(xk) 6= σj(xk)), therefore τˆ (shk) = τ(xk) = σ
j(xk) = 0,
and so the whole product (τˆ (sh1) · ... · τˆ (shn)) is equal to 0. Analogously, if
σh(xk) = 0, then shk = 1−xk and σ
j(xk) = 1 (since σ
h(xk) 6= σj(xk)), therefore
τˆ (shk) = τˆ (1 − xk) = 1 − τ(xk) = 1 − σ
j(xk) = 0, and so the whole product
τˆ (sh1) · ... · τˆ(shn) is equal to 0 again. In conclusion, for every interpretation τ
of the variables, the equation (2) reduces to the trivial identity
f(τ(x1), . . . , τ(xn)) = f(σ
j(x1), . . . , σ
j(xn)) · 1
with τ(x1) = σ
j(x1), . . . , τ(xn) = σ
j(xn).
Briefly, the given proof tells us that for any given interpretation τ the sum-
mation in (3) reduces to that component whose coefficient is determined by the
unique σj equal to τ .
If we use the notation i1, . . . , in instead of σ
i(x1), . . . , σ
i(xn), the equation
just proved can be written as
Proposition 3.1
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i1,...,in∈{0,1}
f(i1, . . . , in) · si1 · ... · sin .
The proof given by Boole in Chapter V of his book (pp.72-74) is not so general
and uniform for all n, but we can say that our presentation captures its hidden
essence.
The point here is somehow delicate. Both Boole’s original proof and our general-
ized version share a purely algebraic nature and are indeed formulated within the
pseudo-binary interpretation of the calculus. Therefore, one may also ask for an
intuitive set theoretical characterization of the development technique for those
functional terms f(x1, . . . , xn) which allow a set theoretical interpretation
19. A
similar requirement is in this context even more relevant then in others because
of the possible presence of numerical coefficients f(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z possibly lying
outside {0, 1}, hence a set theoretical interpretation of the whole development
becomes particularly problematic.
19Also in this case, we will not be pedantic in distinguishing rigorously between terms
denoting sets and their corresponding denotations, which only are properly sets, or between
functional symbols and the functions over the realm of sets they denote.
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To try and accomplish this legitimate request, we will first of all prove, alge-
braically, an interesting fact: the development of a term f(x1, . . . , xn) coincides
with the product of that term with the development of 1 (in the same vari-
ables). By applying the distributive laws, we will even be able to show that the
coincidence holds addendum by addendum. The precise meaning of this claim
needs a more detailed explanation, and, for the sake of simplicity, we limit our
discussion to the case of two variables only (the generalization to any arbitrary
number of variables can be then easily deduced).
By ordinary algebraic syntactical manipulations it can be shown that
1 = xy + x(1− y) + (1− x)y + (1− x)(1 − y) (4)
This equation is valid for all possible values of x and y, not necessarily in
{0, 1}, that is, without any use of the duality law.
By the ordinary distributivity laws we deduce then
f(x, y) = f(x, y) · 1 =
f(x, y)[xy + x(1 − y) + (1 − x)y + (1− x)(1 − y)] =
f(x, y)xy + f(x, y)x(1 − y) + f(x, y)(1− x)y + f(x, y)(1− x)(1 − y).
On the other hand, by the method of the developments
f(x, y) = f(1, 1)xy + f(1, 0)x(1− y) + f(0, 1)(1− x)y + f(0, 0)(1− x)(1 − y).
Therefore, the two sums
f(x, y)xy + f(x, y)x(1 − y) + f(x, y)(1− x)y + f(x, y)(1 − x)(1 − y) (5)
and
f(1, 1)xy + f(1, 0)x(1− y) + f(0, 1)(1− x)y + f(0, 0)(1− x)(1 − y) (6)
must denote, numerically, the same quantity for each binary interpretation σ
of the variables. We will prove something more, i.e., that each addendum of the
first sum can be transformed, by algebraic calculations, into the corresponding
addendum of the second sum (and vice versa).
Before proving it, we want to give a set theoretical interpretation of this
crucial result. To this purpose, we notice first of all that the right term of
(4) coincides with the development of 1, since for arbitrary i and j we have
f(i, j) = 1 where f is the constant function 1.20
From the set theoretical point of view, the development of the universal class
1 can be interpreted as its decomposition into four disjoint classes, whose disjoint
union results indeed in the universal class itself. This fact can be easily checked
by ordinary Eulero-Venn diagrams. See figure 1. As we know, the set theoretical
counterpart of the algebraic product is the set intersection. Therefore, each
addendum of (5) can be seen as the intersection of the class f(x, y) with the
corresponding region of the universal set (whenever f(x, y) is a class). The final
sum is of course f(x, y), algebraically, but this is perfectly coherent with the
20For each n ≥ 1, the coefficient 1 can be identified with the n-ary function f(x1, . . . , xn)
whose value is constantly 1.
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set theoretical interpretation. Let f(x, y) express the class A, if we relativize all
regions of the universal set to A (i.e. we keep only those portions overlapping
with A), and then we join them, we obtain exactly the set A itself. Again, the
Eulero-Venn diagrams give a visual image of this fact. See figure 2.
In virtue of this set theoretical interpretation, we call the method of ana-
lyzing f(x, y) as specified by (5) the method of the intersections and we prove
that
Proposition 3.2 For functional terms f(x, y) in the {+,×,−, 0, 1}-language,
the method of the developments and the method of the intersections are equiv-
alent.
This methodological equivalence makes the method of the developments more
intuitive in the domain of sets: calculating the development of a set f(x, y)
coincides with re-constructing that set by joining disjoint “pieces” of it, each
piece being the “shadow” of f(x, y) over one of the four parts into which the
universal set is standardly decomposed21.
Now to the proof of our claim. We simplify the notation for constituents: we
will write c11, c10, c01, c00 for xy, x(1−y), (1−x)y and (1−x)(1−y), respectively.
Whence, as announced, we prove that f(xy)cij and f(i, j)cij coincide up to
algebraic trasformations22 for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (f(i, j) not necessarily in {0, 1}).
The proof is then by induction on the syntactical construction of f :
• f(x, y) := 0: then f(xy)cij = 0 = f(i, j)cij ;
• f(x, y) := k 6= 0: then f(xy)cij = kcij = f(i, j)cij ;
• f(x, y) is a projection, for instance f(x, y) := x. If cij is of the type xyˆ
for yˆ ∈ {y, (1 − y)}, then it is associated with the coefficient f(1, j) = 1.
Therefore f(i, j)cij = cij ; on the other hand it holds f(x, y)cij = xcij =
x2yˆ = xyˆ = cij . If cij is of the type (1 − x)yˆ for yˆ ∈ {y, (1 − y)}, then it
is associated with the coefficient f(0, j) = 0. Therefore f(i, j)cij = 0; on
the other hand it holds f(x, y)cij = xcij = x(1− x)yˆ = 0 · yˆ = 0;
• f(x, y) := f1(x, y) · f2(x, y). Of course f(i, j) = f1(i, j) · f2(i, j). By IH
fl(x, y)cij = fl(i, j)cij for l = 1, 2. Then, by commutativity of the product
and by the fact that cij satisfies the duality law, f(x, y)cij = (f1(x, y) ·
f2(x, y))cij = (f1(x, y) · f2(x, y))c2ij = f1(x, y)cij · f2(x, y)cij = f1(i, j)cij ·
f2(i, j)cij = (f1(i, j) · f2(i, j))c2ij = (f1(i, j) · f2(i, j))cij = f(i, j)cij ;
• f(x, y) := f1(x, y) ⋄ f2(x, y) for ⋄ ∈ {+,−}. Of course f(i, j) = f1(i, j) ⋄
f2(i, j). By IH fl(x, y)cij = fl(i, j)cij for l = 1, 2. Then, by distributiv-
ity laws, f(x, y)cij = (f1(x, y) ⋄ f2(x, y))cij = f1(x, y)cij ⋄ f2(x, y)cij =
f1(i, j)cij ⋄ f2(i, j)cij = (f1(i, j) ⋄ f2(i, j))cij = f(i, j)cij .
The proof of the coincidence between the two methods is proved for the
general case of generic functions that are not necessarily logical. When non
21Of course, properly speaking, such four parts change along with the interpretation of x
and y.
22This means that they share the same numerical denotations, therefore we show each step of
their reciprocal trasformation by using the identity symbol rather than some artificial symbol
of syntactical reduction: to manipulate the terms, we use nothing but algebraic equations.
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logical functions are involved (for instance f(x, y) = 5, f(x, y) := −x − y or
f(x, y) := x + y + 2) products will be seen as purely algebraic operations and
not as set intersections. We nevertheless use in every situation the expression
“method of the intersections”, as the proved algebraic result represents indeed
a generalization of the set theoretical perspective.
Let us now instantiate some specific case. In the following calculations,
which show the equalence of the terms f(x, y)cij and f(i, j)cij for some con-
crete examples, we may even go beyond the rigid sequence of steps prescribed
by the induction scheme of the proof of Proposition 3.2. After all, that induc-
tion scheme shows that f(x, y)cij and f(i, j)cij denote, numerically, the same
quantity; hence we can use all admissible algebraic transformations freely:
• f(x, y) := xy is always a class. It holds
f(x, y)c11 = xyc11 = xyxy = xy = 1 · xy = 1 · c11 = f(1, 1)c11
f(x, y)c10 = xyc10 = xyx(1 − y) = 0 = 0 · c10 = f(1, 0)c10
f(x, y)c01 = xyc01 = xy(1 − x)y = 0 = 0 · c01 = f(0, 1)c01
f(x, y)c00 = xyc00 = xy(1 − x)(1 − y) = 0 = 0 · c00 = f(0, 0)c00
• f(x, y) := x+ y is sometimes a class. It holds anyway
f(x, y)c11 = (x+ y)xy = x
2y + xy2 = xy + xy = 2xy = f(1, 1)c11
f(x, y)c10 = (x+ y)x(1 − y) = (x+ y)(x− xy) = x
2 − x2y + xy − xy2 =
= x− xy + xy − xy = x− xy = x(1 − y) = 1 · x(1 − y) = f(1, 0)c10
f(x, y)c01 = (x+ y)(1− x)y = (x + y)(y − xy) = xy − x
2y + y2 − xy2 =
= xy − xy + y − xy = y − xy =
= (1− x)y = 1 · (1− x)y = f(0, 1)c01
f(x, y)c00 = (x+ y)(1 − x)(1 − y) = (x+ y)(1 − y − x+ xy) =
= x− xy − x2 + x2y + y − y2 − xy + xy2 =
= x− xy − x+ xy + y − y − xy + xy = 0 = 0 · (1− x)(1− y) = f(0, 0)c00
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3.2 Boole’s propositional calculus
Let us now draw our attention to the cases in which f(x1, . . . , xn) always satisfies
the law of duality, that is, for every possible interpretation of the variables;
this implies that all coefficients of type f(i1, . . . , in), for i1, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1},
belong to {0, 1}. In this context a set theoretical interpretation of the whole
development of f(x1, . . . , xn) is immediate. Let f(i1, ..., in) · ci1...in be the i-th
element of the development. By assumption, f(i1, ..., in) must be interpreted
either as the universe or the empty set. Correspondingly, its intersersection
with the consituent ci1...in will result either in the constituent itself or in the
empty set. In other words, the coefficient f(i1, ..., in) will determine whether
the corresponding constituent ci1...in will contribute or not to the construction
of the set f(x1, ..., xn) as a member of the development union: f(x1, ..., xn) will
be the set resulting from the union of the “survived” constituents.
In such cases, the calculation of developments reflects exactly the standard
method of constructing a propositional formula corresponding to a given truth
table. As well known, such formula is in disjunctive normal form. Take the
i-th line of the truth table with value 1, construct the conjunction of n literals
l1, . . . , ln, with lj ≡ Aj if in that line Aj is assigned the value 1, lj ≡ ¬Aj if it
is assigned the value 0. Build the disjunction of all the conjuncts so obtained.
For example, a formula corresponding to the truth table
A1 A2 A3
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
is the following: (A1 ∧ A2 ∧ A3) ∨ (A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ A3) ∨ (A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ ¬A3) ∨
(¬A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ A3) ∨ (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ ¬A3). In Boole’s language, every positive
literal Aj is replaced by xj and every negative literal ¬Aj is replaced by (1−xj),
∧ is replaced by × and ∨ by +. Therefore, if f(x, y, z) is the (binary) function
whose graph coincides with the given truth table, we obtain that f(x, y, z) =
xyz+x(1−y)z+x(1−y)(1−z)+(1−x)(1−y)z+(1−x)(1−y)(1−z). This is
equal to 1 ·xyz+0 ·xy(1− z)+ 1 ·x(1− y)z+1 ·x(1− y)(1− z)+ 0 · (1−x)yz+
0 · (1 − x)y(1 − z) + 1 · (1 − x)(1 − y)z + 1 · (1 − x)(1 − y)(1 − z), that is, the
development of f(x, y, z).23 By interpreting set theoretically the development so
obtained, according to the instructions suggested above, we have automatically
a set theoretical interpretation of f(x, y) as a well determined set.
Vice versa, every development with all coefficients f(i1, ..., in) in {0, 1} de-
fines a truth table by retracing the process in the opposite direction.
Boole comes very close to a fundamental aspect of the symmetry between
propositions and classes, at the base of the modern Boolean algebra.
23One could argue that in this way ∨ is translated into the exclusive disjunction rather than
into the inclusive one, but this is irrelevant: the different lines of the truth table are mutually
exclusive, hence in this context “vel” and “out” coincide!
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Nevertheless, he does not seem to be aware of this fact. The correspondence
between the two domains that he sees is of completely different nature. Well,
we could even argue that he sees no correspondence at all! Rather, only a trivial
reduction; the idea is to interpret a variable v as the set of moments in which a
given proposition A is true:
Let us employ the capital letters X,Y, Z, to denote the elemen-
tary propositions concerning which we desire to make some assertion
touching their truth or falsehood (...) And let us employ the cor-
responding small letters x, y, z, considered as expressive of mental
operations, in the following sense, viz. : Let x represent an act of
the mind by which we fix our regard upon that portion of time for
which the proposition X is true; and let this meaning be understood
when it is asserted x denotes the time for which the proposition X
is true. Let us further employ the connecting signs +,−,=,& in the
following sense, viz.: Let x+y denote the aggregate of those portions
of time for which the propositions X and Y are respectively true,
those times being entirely separated from each other. Similarly let
x− y denote the remainder of time which is left when we take away
from the portion of time for which X is true, that (by supposition)
included portion for which Y is true. Also, let x = y denote that the
time for which the proposition X is true, is identical with the time
for which the proposition Y is true. (pp.164–165)
3.3 Empty constituents
What does it happen when the coefficients f(i, j) do not belong to {0, 1}?
For instance, the partial binary tables of + and − presented earlier can be
extended to total tables by completing the missing arithmetical calculations, so
to obtain
A B A+B A−B
1 1 2 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 -1
0 0 0 0
This point is very delicate, since the values 2 and −1 have no direct set
theoretical meaning (nothing is greater than the whole or smaller than the
nothing!). Contrary to expectations, Boole is able to draw from such “unlogical”
values, a kind of logical information. The idea is simple: every constituent
preceded by a coefficient different from 0 or 1 in the development of a term is
going to be identified with the empty set! Be careful now: it is the constituent,
and not its coefficent, to be identified with such a set. The, so to say, set
theoretical interpretation of the coefficient reduces to a mere warning for the
emptiness of its constituent.
Let us calculate for example the development of the term f(x, y) := x+ y:
x+ y = 2xy + x(1 − y) + (1− x)y.
The constituent xy has coefficient 2. According to Boole’s claim, this coefficient
indicates that the intersection of x with y is the empty set (as really must
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be, being x and y by assumption disjoint!). As another example, consider the
development of x− y. This results in
x− y = x(1 − y)− (1 − x)y.
Here, the intersection of (1−x) with y will be again the empty set (as must be,
by the assumption that the whole y is included in x).
In spite of its good behaviour in these two examples, the reader might feel
quite perplex about a suggestion that looks totally arbitrary in itself. But this is
not the case, and Boole justifies his claim by proving, algebraically, the following
theorem which opens the 11th paragraph of the sixth chapter:
If a function V , intended to represent any class or collection of objects,
w, be expanded, and if the numerical coefficient, a, of any constituent in its
development, do not satisfy the law, a(1−a) = 0, then the constituent in question
must be made equal to 0.
In the proof, Boole assumes that
w = a1t1 + a2t2 + · · ·+ antn (7)
where the right term of this equation is the development of V (which means
that the terms ti are constituents). From (7) we immediately obtain that w
2 =
(a1t1 + a2t2 + ... + antn)
2, and then w = (a1t1 + a2t2 + ... + antn)
2, because
w, as a variable, is subjected to the duality law. The distributivity laws allow
us to compute the value of the square, i.e., of (a1t1 + a2t2 + ... + antn)(a1t1 +
a2t2 + ... + antn). The computation is very easy because, on the one hand,
aiti · aiti = a2i ti for all i, and on the other, aiti · ajtj = 0 whenever i 6= j: for
that, observe that for some variable v, either v is a factor of ti and (1− v) of tj ,
or viceversa.
So we obtain
w = a21t1 + a
2
2t2 + ...+ a
2
ntn (8)
Let ai1 , ..., aim be all the coefficients among a1, ..., an that do not satisfy the
duality law. For all other coefficients it holds a = a2, therefore by subtracting
(8) from (7) we deduce
0 = (ai1 − a
2
i1
)ti1 + (ai2 − a
2
i2
)ti2 + ...+ (aim − a
2
im
)tim , that is to say
0 = ai1(1− ai1)ti1 + ai2(1 − ai2)ti2 + ...+ aim(1− aim)tim (9)
By multiplying both sides in (9) by tij with 1 ≤ j ≤ m, one infers in each
case 0 = aij (1−aij )tij (all the other addenda disappear for the very same reason
as above). But aij (1− aij ) 6= 0 by assumption, and this yelds that tij = 0.
Boole’s proof is algebraically correct. Notwithstanding, the reader may feel
unhappy with it, as, once again, its purely algebraic nature hides completely
any set theoretical interpretation.
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We give two alternative explanations closely related to each other which are
still of numerical nature,24 nevertheless they are based on the coincidence of the
method of the developments with that of the intersections. We think that this
may help, in particular in the second argument, to perceive some more evident
set theoretical flavour. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we deal with the case
of two variables only.
By (the proof of) Proposition 3.2, f(i, j)cij = f(x, y)cij (for all possible
binary variable interpretations). Morevorer we know that Boole’s calculus can
be simulated within the ordinary algebraic calculus by considering only the
variable interpretations which are solutions of the equation system ⋆:
x2 = x
y2 = y
f(x, y)2 = f(x, y).
First argument. For all binary variable interpretations satisfying ⋆ it holds
f(x, y)2 = f(xy). For such interpretations, we deduce then:
f(i, j)cij = f(x, y)cij = f(x, y)
2c2ij = (f(x, y)cij)
2 = (f(i, j)cij)
2.
Therefore f(i, j)cij = (f(i, j)cij)
2. If f(i, j) 6= f(i, j)2, then it must be
cij = 0 (for all binary interpretations allowed by ⋆.
Second argument. For all variable interpretations fulfilling ⋆, we can see
f(x, y) as a set. Hence, f(x, y)cij will represent the intersection of two sets,
which in turn is a set. Therefore, f(x, y)cij must satisfy the duality law, and the
same must then apply, numerically, to f(i, j)cij . When f(i, j) /∈ {0, 1}, the only
condition for this to hold is that cij is algebraically null, i.e., set theoretically
seen as the empty set.
3.4 The logical meaning of division
According to Michael Dummett, the division operator has no logical meaning
at all, in [11] Dummett writes “He introduced a division sign for the opera-
tion inverse to intersection, and never succeeded in unravelling the complicated
tangles which resulted from this.”
Let us consider Boole’s analysis of the proposition “Clean beasts are those
which both divide the hoof and chew the cud”, formalized as x = yz (pp.86–
87). Boole is tempted to infer from this equation the validity of a new one,
z = x
y
, through the ordinary algebraic introduction of division; but immediately
after he observes that this “equation is not at present in an interpretable form”
(p.87). At the same time, he goes on saying “If we can reduce it to such a form
it will furnish the relation required” (p.87).
The interpretable form Boole is referring to is the development of x
y
, which is:
x
y
=
1
1
xy +
1
0
x(1 − y) +
0
1
(1− x)y +
0
0
(1− x)(1 − y) (10)
By that, the problem of providing a meaning to the operation of division is
reduced to that of providing a meaning to 10 and
0
0 .
24It could not be any different, as long as coefficients with no direct set theoretical inter-
pretation are possibly concerned.
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According to Boole the quotient 10 should be dealt with in the same way as
non binary coefficients seen so far. While commenting on his theorem for the
treatment of non binary coefficients, he states:
(...) it may be shown generally that any constituent whose coef-
ficient is not subject to the same fundamental law as the symbols
themselves25 must be separately equated to 0. The usual form under
which such coefficients occur is 10 . This is the algebraic symbol of
infinity. Now the nearer any number approaches to infinity (allowing
such an expression), the more does it depart from the condition of
satisfying the fundamental law above referred to. (p.91)
Boole treats the “infinity”, as he calls it, as the limit of quantities whose de-
gree of compliance of the duality law is proportionally inverse to their magnitude
(“the nearer any number approaches to infinity... the more does it depart from
the condition of satisfying the fundamental law”: formally, limx→∞(x
2 − x) =
∞). Hence, whatever this object might be, it should not satisfy the duality law
at the highest degree; by that, its treatment as an ordinary number different
from 0 and 1 will follow.26
As for the coefficient 00 Boole affirms:
The symbol 00 [...] does not necessarily disobey the law we are here
considering, for it admits of the numerical values 0 and 1 indif-
ferently. Its actual interpretation, however, as an indefinite class
symbol, cannot, I conceive, except upon the ground of analogy, be
deduced from its arithmetical properties, but must be established
experimentally. (pp.91–92)
[...] The symbol 00 indicates that a perfectly indefinite portion of the
class, i.e. some, none, or all of its members are to be taken. (p.92)
Boole claims that the interpretation of 00 “must be established experimen-
tally” (p.92), and starts by considering the statement “Men who are not mortals
do not exist”. By denoting “men” as y and “mortal beings” as x he comes to
the equation y(1−x) = 0, transformed into y− yx = 0, and finally into yx = y.
In ordinary algebra one would then proceed by dividing both sides by y (for a
non vanishing y), so to obtain x = y
y
and conclude x = 1. But, of course, the
conclusion that all things are mortal is not contained in the assumption and we
do not want it!
Boole knows that “the operation of division cannot be performed with the
symbols with which we are now engaged” (p.89) and again he suggests us to
calculate the development of y
y
: “Our resource, then, is to express the operation,
and develop the result by the method’ of the preceding chapter” (i.e. the method
of developments) (p.89).
25Of course, the duality law.
26In ordinary algebra, the argument ( 1
0
)2 = 1
2
02
= 1
0
, apparently proving the duality law
for 1
0
, has no sense, as 1
0
is no number. Consequently, the argument does not need to hold
in Boole’s calculus either. One can also observe that in non standard analysis the sequences(
1
1
n
)
n
and
(
1
( 1
n
)2
)
n
define two well distinct unlimited non standard numbers, the second
being larger than the first one.
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Well, from the equation x = y
y
by calculating the development of y
y
we
obtain:
x = y +
0
0
(1− y).
Simple semantic observations lead Boole to extract some meaningful logical
information from it:
This implies that mortals (x) consist of all men (y), together with
such a remainder of beings which are not men (1 − y), as will be
indicated by the coefficient 00 . Now let us inquire what remainder
of “not men” is implied by the premise. It might happen that the
remainder included all the beings who are not men, or it might
include only some of them, and not others, or it might include none,
and any one of these assumptions would be in perfect accordance
with our premiss [...] and therefore the expression 00 here indicates
that all, some or none of the class to whose expression it is affixed
it must be taken. (pp.89–90)
He then quite optimistically and without proof concludes:
Although the above determination of the significance of the symbol
0
0 is founded only upon the examination of a particular case, yet
the principle involved in the demonstration is general, and there
are no circumstances under which the symbol can present itself to
which the same mode of analysis is inapplicable. We may properly
term 00 an indefinite class symbol, and may, if convenience should
require, replace it by an uncompounded symbol v, subject to the
fundamental law, v(1− v) = 0. (p.90)
The task of providing a clear meaning to the operation of division so as
to include also expressions such as 00 and
1
0 remains untouched by Boole. In
what follows we try to address this task and we make a proposal with the effect
that the ‘new’ operation of division will coincide with the standard operation
whenever the denominator is different from 0, and it is in accordance with
Boole’s desiderata as to k0 , k ≥ 0.
Our proposal starts from the obvious consideration that the division operator
is the inverse operation of the multiplication. This is essentially what Boole
himself requires, in other words, the validity of
x
y
= z ⇔ x = yz (11)
It is important to notice from the start that the equivalence above, read in
set theoretical terms, says that the division operation has a value if and only if
x ⊆ y. (12)
A major difference with respect to ordinary algebra is that the values z are
(almost) always undetermined (not only for null y). In fact, x
y
, thus z, is any
set that intersected with y results in x:
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xy
y = x. (13)
There are in general infinitely many possible values of z which are suitable
for the goal, more precisely, every set z ranging from x to x + (1 − y) will
work. This reflects exactly Boole’s words “all, some, or none”, concerning the
members of (1 − x)(1 − y) (p.90).27 See the following Euler-Venn diagrams in
Figure 3 for a visual clarification of this fact.28
x(1− y)
yz1 = xz2z3z4
Figure 3: z is undetermined.
If we want to simulate the set-theoretical calculus enriched with the division
operator by a suitable quantitative algebraic calculus, we must therefore preserve
somehow this idea of multi-valuedeness. A possible way out is to say that any
operation satisfying the three requirements below is a good interpretation of the
division operation. In the following, p and q are arbitrary rational numbers and
div is used to denote the ordinary division between rational numbers (to avoid
ambiguity with /):
1. p
q
= div(p, q), for p 6= 0 6= q;
2. p0 ∈ Q \ {0, 1}, whenever p 6= 0;
3. 00 ∈ {0, 1}.
Notice that the second condition is in accordance with Boole’s claim that 10
fails to fulfill the duality law, whereas the third condition meets his idea of 00 as
an undetermined quantity that nevertheless should always represent a class.29
In this approach 00 and
k
0 are admissible expressions denoting quantities, so
the realm of fractions of standard algebra is extended.
Consider now the generalization of (11):
s
t
= u ⇔ s = tu (14)
27Of course, which one of the three cases will depend on the different individual examples.
What we give here is a general theory designed by abstraction from single cases.
28T. Hailperin, one of the very few authors, to our knowledge, suggesting a possible rigorous
treatment of the division, shares with us the same starting point ([16]. pp.70–77). But his
approach is very different from ours: he develops a rigorous system with techniques of modern
algebra that are external to Boole’s conceptual background. We rather prefer to clarify the
notion of division Boole worked with by shaping his fundamental intuitions through a suitable
extension of the pseudo-binary calculus. In particular, for Hailpering 0
0
and 1
0
denote algebraic
abstract entities, whereas they are ordinary numbers in our approach.
29Beside the conditions 1–3, the reader may reasonably ask for a forth natural requirement,
that is, k
0
= k 1
0
for k 6= 0. The reader is of course allowed to select a function respecting this
further restriction, however this is not relevant for our discussion here.
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for arbitrary terms s, t, u. This holds in ordinary algebra only if t 6= 0, otherwise
it has no meaning at all. On the contrary, in our new calculus this equation is
valid also for s = t = 0, whereas it is not valid for s 6= 0 and t = 0. This last
fact can be motivated in set theoretical terms by noticing that s0 has a meaning
only when s is a subset of the empty set, hence s0 is set theoretically not allowed
when s 6= 0. On the other hand, 00 is perfectly acceptable since ∅ ⊆ ∅ and it
satisfies the fundamental equivalence (11).
A direct consequence valid in the same domain (hence, in particular, for
s = 0 = t) is the generalization of (13),
s
t
t = s (15)
(just substitute u by s
t
in virtue of s
t
= u): set theoretically, whenever s is a
subset of t, then s
t
is a set that intersected with t gives s.
The involved validity condition is then:
no denumerator vanishes unless the corresponding numerator does the same
(16)
This condition extends the usual one required in ordinary algebra:
no denumerator vanishes (17)
It is then not difficult to see that under (16), or in the case u satisfies the
law of duality (as it will be the case below), also the following law from ordinary
algebra is preserved:
s
t
u =
su
tu
u. (18)
This relation will be soon of fundamental importance.
However, here are two cases for which a larger domain of validity is not
granted. The first one is particularly interesting:
st
t
= s (19)
It fails to be true for t = 0, 00 := i and s 6= i. This failure, however unpleasant
at first sight, perfectly agrees with the fact that even if st is always a subset of
t, this does not imply that s is the only set that intersected with t gives us st.
Analogue observations apply to the equations
s
t
=
su
tu
s
t
u
v
=
su
tv
that do not necessarily hold: neither set-theoretically, nor numerically under
(16).
Nevertheless, the given definition of division suffices to prove our main re-
quirement: the extension of Proposition 3.2 to the division operator.
27
Proposition 3.3 For functional terms f(x, y) in the full algebraic language
{+,×,−, /, 0, 1}, the method of the developments and the method of the inter-
sections are equivalent.
First of all let us observe that the methods of the developments and the proof of
Proposition 3.1 can be immediately transferred to the division. The proof of that
proposition is in fact completely independent of the type of f , the only delicate
point is to ensure that all possible fractional terms are always admissible, but
this is indeed the case in our system.
Therefore, it remains just to complete the proof of Proposition 3.2 with the
induction step:
• f(x, y) := f1(x,y)
f2(x,y)
. Of course f(i, j) = f1(i,j)
f2(i,j)
. By IH fl(x, y)cij and
fl(i, j)cij coincide up to algebraic transformations for l = 1, 2. Then,
by (18), since cij satisfies the duality law, f(x, y)cij :=
f1(x,y)
f2(x,y)
cij =
f1(x,y)cij
f2(x,y)cij
cij =
f1(i,j)cij
f2(i,j)cij
cij =
f1(i,j)
f2(i,j)
cij := f(i, j)cij .
The proof is now complete.
But this is not the end of the story. It is interesting to notice that by mere
algebraic calculations an alternative justification of Boole’s interpretation of
division can be given. Such justification relies only on the syntactic rule (11)
and on an application of the method of the intersection to x
y
:
x
y
=
x
y
xy +
x
y
x(1 − y) +
x
y
(1 − x)y +
x
y
(1− x)(1 − y). (20)
Let now x
y
= z for some z. We obtain from (20)
x
y
= zxy + zx(1− y) + z(1− x)y + z(1− x)(1 − y).
Since (11) holds by assumption, we have
x
y
= zyzy+ zyz(1− y) + z(1− yz)y + z(1− x)(1 − y) =
yz + yz(1− y) + z(1− yz)y + z(1− x)(1 − y). (21)
The variable z is present in all the four addenda, but only in the last it plays
an essential role, as the following calculations show:
• yz = xy, since from x
y
= z follows that x = yz, and so xy = y2z = yz;
• yz(1− y) = zy(1− y) = z · 0 = 0
• z(1− yz)y = (z − yz)y = z(1− y)y = 0
So far each addendum coincides with the corresponding one in the develop-
ment (10).
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z remains only in the forth addendum z(1−x)(1−y). Since z is an unknown
parameter, the situation is exactly the one described by Boole’s expression “all,
some, or none” referred to the members of (1 − x)(1 − y) (p.90).
In conclusion, the use of the intersections yields the same intuitive interpre-
tations of 10 and
0
0 suggested by Boole. And since x and y range over all possible
classes, this proof has the highest degree of generality.
As a side remark, we observe that an hypothetical application of (19), i.e.
st
t
= s, would on the contrary imply syntactically the unpleasant result x
y
= x.
First of all, observe that under (13) x = xy, since x = xx = x
y
yx = x
y
y2x =
x
y
yyx = xyx = xy. Hence, by (19), x
y
= xy
y
= x. Although this result would
deliver one of the suitable outputs, the multi-valudeness of the division would
be lost in this way. But, as we have seen, st
t
= s is not valid under (16) for
every allowed interpretation of the division!
We conclude our analysis of the division by an inspection of its pseudo-binary
table:
A B A/B
1 1 1
1 0 q 6= 0, 1
0 1 0
0 0 0 or 1
This table shows how the use of ∅ and U reflects the behaviour of the division
over all possible sets A and B, analogously to what happens for the other
operations! Always according to (11) and (15), the idea is that A/B is defined
only when A ⊆ B and in this case A/B is such that
A =
A
B
∩B.
As to the first line of the table above, U = Z ∩U if and only if Z = U . The
second line instead originates no set, as U is not a subset of ∅, and therefore
it is set theoretically not allowed. As to the third line, the intersection of any
set Z with a non empty set results in ∅ if and only if Z = ∅. For the fourth,
we observe that ∅ = Z ∩ ∅ holds for all sets, in particular for Z = ∅ or Z = U .
This is in perfect agreement with the fact that all sets Z ranging from A to
A+ (1− B) are valid solutions. If only ∅ and U are available, then Z = A = ∅
or Z = A+ (1−B) = ∅+ (U − ∅) = U .
4 Conclusion: the correspondence revisited
John Corcoran in his introduction to The Laws of Thought, Prometheus Books
2003, says that
Boole is one of the most misunderstood of the major philosophers
of logic. He gets criticized for things he did not do, or did not do
wrong. He never confused logic with psycology. He gets credits for
things he did not do, or did not do right. He did not write the first
book on pure mathematics and he did not devise ‘Boolean algebra’.
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Even where there is no question of blame or praise, his ideas are
misdescribed or, worse, ignored.(pag xxix-xxx)
We do agree with Corcoran. In the present paper we have tried to present
the basis of Boole’s logical theory as it emerges from The Laws of Thought
with its good and bad features. To this aim we have proved that the method
of developments, once it is seen through the method of intersections, shows its
clear set-theoretical meaning and it shows how natural and effective was Boole’s
idea of decomposing a concept in the way he did. In our analysis, it emerges
that the operations that Boole denotes by + and − are neither the standard
set-theoretical union (between disjoint sets or not) nor the set-theoretical dif-
ference. + and − are partial operations.30 What emerges from our work is that
those operations are not defined, set-theoretically, exactly when the correspond-
ing algebraic operations assume values outside {0, 1}. The division operation
in the algebra of logic is again a partial operation, as it is in quantitative algebra.
Furthermore, we have tried to provide a mathematical interpretation justifying
the logical conception of Boole’s division and his intuitive treatment of unusual
coefficients such as 10 and
0
0 .
At each stage of our presentation of Boole’s theory we have insisted in checking
if the alleged correspondence between algebra and logic were achieved or not,
or in which degree. Do they share the same universal laws? This point is of
fundamental importance, since an essential part of Boole’s machinery relies on
the perfect formal correspondence between them so that we should nowadays
rather speak of two different interpretations of a formally unique calculus. As
Boole himself says, when proving the validity of a logical law or of an argument
through symbolic calculations, one would be allowed to suspend the logical inter-
pretation in all intermediate steps and rely only on the application of ordinary
algebraic rules plus the law of duality. The presumed existence of a perfect
formal correspondence between the logical and the quantitative pseudo-binary
calculi would always guarantee the correctness of the proof:
It has been seen, that any system of propositions may be expressed
by equations involving symbols x, y, z, which, whenever interpre-
tation is possible, are subject to laws identical in form with the laws
of a system of quantitative symbols, susceptible only of the values
0 and 1 [...]. But as the formal processes of reasoning depend only
upon the laws of the symbols, and not upon the nature of their in-
terpretation, we are permitted to treat the above symbols, x, y, z, as
if they were quantitative symbols of the kind above described. We
may in fact lay aside the logical interpretation of the symbols in the
given equation; convert them into quantitative symbols, susceptible
only of the values 0 and 1; perform upon them as such all the req-
uisite processes of solution; and finally restore to them their logical
interpretation. (pp.69–70)
Actually, despite Boole’s enthusiatic slogan about the correspondence of the
two calculi, he seems perfectly aware of the irreducible discrepancy produced
30 Corcoran in his introduction agrees on this point, see pag xxx-xxxi).
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by the need of interpretational restrictions for his logical calculus. Nevertheless,
instead of being worried about it, he thinks (quite unexepctedly, we would say)
that he can take advantage of it:
The processes to which the symbols x, y, z regarded as quantitative
and of the species above described, are subject, are not limited by
those conditions of thought to which they would, if performed upon
purely logical symbols, be subject, and a freedom of operation is
given to us in the use of them, without which, the inquiry after a
general method in Logic would be a hopeless quest. (p.70)
We see here somehow a sudden change of perspective. Although Boole had
insisted, as much as possible, on the perfect correspondence between the alge-
braic and the logical caluli, in the end his true idea becomes that of substituting
the logical calculus by the quantative pseudo-binary calculus, taking advantage
of the freedom of interpretation in the latter. The subtle point to appreciate
here is that such substitution is recommended because it is not vacuous: the
two calculi do not coincide and one is more efficient than the other!
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